We consider an axiomatic characterization of the plurality rule, which selects the alternative(s) most preferred by the largest number of individuals. We strengthen the characterization result of Yeh (Economic Theory 34: 575-583, 2008) by replacing efficiency axiom by the weaker axiom called faithfulness. Formally, we show that the plurality rule is the only rule satisfying anonymity, neutrality, reinforcement, tops-only, and faithfulness.
Introduction
We consider the problem of choosing alternatives from a fixed set of finitely many alternatives. A social choice function assigns chosen alternative(s) to each profile of preferences of individuals in a society. We consider the case where the number of individuals may vary and each individual's preference is a linear order (no indifference between any two alternatives).
In this setting Yeh (2008) characterized the plurality rule, which selects the alternative(s) most preferred by the largest number of individuals: the plurality rule is the only rule satisfying anonymity, neutrality, reinforcement, tops-only, and efficiency.
1 Anonymity and neutrality are standard symmetric * Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo, 7-3-1, Hongo, Bunkyoku, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan. Tel.: +81-3-5841-5598 Fax: +81-3-5841-5521 E-mail: ysekiguchi.econ@gmail.com 1 Other characterizations of the plurality rule are found in Richelson (1978) and Ching (1996) . axioms: the former requires that the names of individuals should not matter, and the latter requires that the names of alternatives should not matter. Reinforcement is an invariance axiom which requires that if two disjoint groups of individuals choose the same alternative, then their union should also choose this alternative.
2 Tops-only requires that the choice should depend only on the information about top-ranked alternatives of individuals.
3
Efficiency requires that inefficient alternatives should not be chosen.
We strengthen Yeh (2008)'s characterization result by replacing efficiency by the weaker axiom called faithfulness: when there is only one individual, her most preferred alternative should be uniquely chosen (Young, 1974) . Namely, we show that the plurality rule is the only rule satisfying anonymity, neutrality, reinforcement, tops-only, and faithfulness (Theorem 1).
Our characterization result is related to Young (1974)'s characterization of Borda's rule (Borda, 1781) . 4 Young (1974) considered cancellation axiom: if for all x and y in X, the number of individuals preferring x to y equals the number of individuals preferring y to x, then all alternatives are chosen. And Young (1974) showed that Borda's rule is the unique rule satisfying cancellation and our axioms excepting tops-only. That is,
anonymity, neutrality, reinf orcement, f aithf ulness
+ tops-only ⇐⇒ plurality rule (Theorem 1) cancellation ⇐⇒ Borda's rule (Young 1974)
Definitions
There is a countable set N of "potential" individuals. Let N be the family of all nonempty and finite subsets of N. Let X be the finite set of alternatives. We denote P the set of all linear orders (transitive, antisymmetric, and complete binary relations) on X. Given N ∈ N and i ∈ N , we denote individual i's preference by P i ∈ P, a preference profile by P N = (P i ) i∈N , and the set of all preference profiles by P N . A social choice function is a mapping f : N ∈N P N → 2 X \ {∅}. Let T (P i ) be i's top-ranked alternative, and T (P N ) = (T (P i )) i∈N the profile of top-ranked alternatives. Let T (x, P N ) be the number of individuals whose top-ranked alternative is x, that is,
The plurality rule f P is defined by
Yeh (2008) showed that the plurality rule is characterized by the following five axioms.
Given N ∈ N , let Π N be set of all permutations on
Let Σ be the set of all permutations on X. Given P ∈ P and σ ∈ Σ, let σ(P ) be a linear order defined by σ(x)σ(P )σ(y) iff xP y. Given N ∈ N , let σ(P N ) = (σ(P i )) i∈N .
Neutrality: ∀N ∈ N , ∀P
N ∈ P N , ∀σ ∈ Σ, f (σ(P N )) = σ(f (P N )). Reinforcement: ∀N, N ∈ N with N ∩ N = ∅, ∀P N ∈ P N , ∀P N ∈ P N , f (P N ) ∩ f (P N ) = ∅ ⇒ f (P N , P N ) = f (P N ) ∩ f (P N ).
Tops-only: ∀N ∈ N , ∀P
N , P N ∈ P N , T (P N ) = T (P N ) ⇒ f (P N ) = f (P N ). Efficiency: ∀N ∈ N , ∀P N ∈ P N , ∃x, y ∈ X, ∀i ∈ N , yP i x ⇒ x / ∈ f (P N ).
Result
We strengthen Yeh (2008)'s characterization result by replacing efficiency by the weaker axiom called faithfulness.
Faithfulness: ∀N ∈ N with
Faithfulness requires that when there is only one individual, her topranked alternative should be uniquely chosen, or equivalently, inefficient alternatives should not be chosen. Thus, faithfulness is weaker than efficiency.
Theorem 1 A social choice function f is the plurality rule f P if and only if it satisfies anonymity, neutrality, reinforcement, tops-only, and faithfulness.
To prove our theorem, we begin with the following simple observation.
Lemma 1
Suppose that f is a social choice function satisfying anonymity, neutrality, and tops-only. For each N ∈ N and each
Proof Suppose that f is a social choice function satisfying the three axioms. Let N ∈ N and P N ∈ P N . Since f satisfies tops-only, f (P N ) depends only on T (P N ). Furthermore, anonymity and neutrality implies that for all x and y in X such that T (x, P N ) = T (y, P N ), x ∈ f (P N ) if and only if y ∈ f (P N ).
Suppose that | i∈N T (P i )| = |N |. Then, we have
T (P i ) and
which completes the proof.
The following lemma is a variant of Lemma 1 in Yeh (2008) . It states that if f satisfies our five axioms and the most preferred alternatives of all individuals differ, then the chosen alternatives are the most preferred ones.
Lemma 2
Suppose that f is a social choice function satisfying anonymity, neutrality, reinforcement, tops-only, and faithfulness. For each N ∈ N and each
Proof Suppose that f is a social choice function satisfying the five axioms. Let N ∈ N and P N ∈ P N . Suppose, to the contrary, that | i∈N T (P i )| = |N | and there exists x / ∈ i∈N T (P i ) such that x ∈ f (P N ). Take any P ∈ P such that T (P ) = x. Then, by faithfulness, f (P ) = {x}. However, reinforcement implies that f (P N , P ) = f (P N ) ∩ f (P ) = {x}, which contradicts Lemma 1.
Proof of Theorem 1 Obviously, the plurality rule f P satisfies the five axioms. Conversely, suppose that f is a social choice function satisfying the five axioms. Due to Lemma 2, it suffices to consider only the case where | i∈N T (P i )| < |N |. 5 Suppose that m = max x∈X T (x, P N ). Consider a partition {N 1 , · · · , N m } of N such that for each component N k if i, j ∈ P N k , then T (P i ) = T (P j ). Then, for each N k , | i∈N k T (P i )| = |N k |, and hence Lemma 2 implies that f (P N k ) = i∈N k T (P i ). Thus, if T (x, P N ) = m, then ∀N k , x ∈ f (P N k ); if T (x, P N ) < m, then ∃N k , x / ∈ f (P N k ). Hence, by reinforcement f (P N ) = k∈{1,···,m} f (P N k ) = arg max x∈X T (x, P N ) = f P (P N ), which completes the proof.
